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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This paper focuses on the effect of increased board independence on the efficiency of 
internal capital markets in diversified firms. We find that the increase in board 
independence post-SOX may have moved firms away from their optimal board 
structure. Our results suggest that, relative to the pre-SOX period, increased board 
independence post-SOX had a negative effect on diversified firms’ excess value and 
internal capital market efficiency. This suggests that firms may not have benefited from 
the move towards higher independence in the post-SOX era. Mutual back scratching and 
socialization within the firm may explain the ineffectiveness and inefficiency of 
increased board independence in diversified firms. 
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Chapter One 
 
Introduction 
Ever since the corporate scandals of the early 2000s and the consequent 
imposition of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) and NYSE/NASDAQ listing rules, firms 
were obliged to have a majority of independent directors serving on their boards. Guo 
and Masulis (2013) find that boards have become larger and more independent post-
SOX.  
The question of whether increased board independence is beneficial for the firm 
has been widely discussed in the literature. While inside directors are thought to be 
better advisors because they have more firm-specific information, independent directors 
are thought to be better monitors because of their independence from CEOs. That is, 
outsiders are more capable of disciplining managers if necessary (Weisbach, 1988). 
Outsiders also have reputation concerns which may align their interests with those of the 
shareholders (Fama and Jensen, 1983). However, outsiders’ ability to monitor 
effectively can be compromised due to their holding of little stake in the company which 
creates free rider problems. In addition, Brick et al. (2006) suggest that socialization and 
mutual back-scratching may be describe the relationship between independent directors 
top management. These issues raise concerns about whether having more independent 
directors on corporate boards leads to better monitoring. Bhagat and Black (1999) find 
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that firms with "supermajority-independent boards" are less profitable. They suggest that 
having a moderate number of independent directors may still be beneficial. 
Although many studies exist that link board composition with monitoring and 
firm performance, it is difficult to establish a causal link between board composition and 
better monitoring (Guo & Masulis 2013). The capability of corporate boards monitor 
effectively may be due to factors other than its observable attributes. This endogeneity 
issue remains a problem for corporate governance researchers (Adams, Hermalin, & 
Weisbach, 2010). To overcome this problem, we take advantage of an exogenous shock, 
SOX, which causes a change in board composition. Firms are required by SOX and the 
new exchange listing rules to have (i) boards with a majority of independent directors, 
(ii) nominating, audit, and compensation committees which are fully independent, and 
(iii) to hold regular executive meetings solely attended by independent directors (Guo & 
Masulis 2013). 
This paper focuses on the effect of increased board independence, due to the 
passage of SOX in 2002, on the efficiency of internal capital markets in diversified 
firms. Shin and Stulz (1998) find that diversified firms treat segments with better 
investment opportunities in a similar fashion to other segments, which suggests that 
internal capital markets are inefficient. Scharfstein & Stein (2000) who present a 
theoretical model which implies some kind of socialism in the allocation of capital 
within the firm. The misallocation of capital is partly due to an agency problem between 
the shareholders and the firm’s headquarters. Thus, the internal capital market will fail if 
the ineffective corporate governance structure allows the manager to misallocate 
corporate resources and pursue his/her own objectives at the expense of shareholders. 
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Therefore, firms with a better governance structure and more effective monitoring are 
expected to have a more efficient internal capital market. 
In this paper, we split our sample into 2 sub-periods: (i) Pre-SOX (1996 – 2001); 
and (ii) Post-SOX (2003-2008). In addition, we split our sample into two subsamples: (i) 
Firms that were not in compliance with the independence requirements prior to SOX and 
became complying afterwards; and (ii) Firms that were already in compliance with the 
new requirements before SOX. 
Our results show that firms experienced an increase in board independence post-
SOX, which is consistent with similar findings in the literature (e.g. Guo & Masulis. 
2013; Dah, Frye, & Hurst, 2014)We also find that this increase, which is due to the 
imposed regulations, may have moved firms away from their optimal board structure. 
We document a negative effect of board independence on diversification and internal 
capital market efficiency in the post-SOX period relative to the pre-SOX period. This 
demonstrates that firms did not benefit from the move towards higher independence in 
the post-SOX era. This applies to both subsamples: (i) firms that were previously 
compliant; and (ii) those that weren’t compliant with the mandates.  
Mutual back scratching and socialization could be the reasons behind this 
negative effect. The move towards higher independence post-SOX may have allowed 
CEOs and top management to hire independent directors who fit the legal description of 
independent directors but were linked to management in other ways 
(Romano,2004).Moreover, Linck, Netter, and Yang (2008) propose that a one-size-fits-
all regulation may be inefficient and could move firms away from their optimum board 
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composition. Dah, Frye, and Hurst (2014) suggest that the legislation may have had 
unintended implications on already compliant firms. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: section 1 reviews the literature, 
section 2 explains the sample and the used methodology, section 3 presents descriptive 
statistics, section 4 discusses the results of the study, and section 5 concludes. 
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Chapter Two 
Literature Review 
2.1. Board Independence 
 
The role of the board of directors could be divided into two main functions: 
Monitoring and Advising (Linck et al. 2008; Raheja 2005; Adams & Ferriera 2007).  
Weisbach (1988) argues that outside directors are more effective at monitoring 
because they are independent from CEOs and are therefore capable of challenging them. 
He shows that CEOs are more likely to resign following poor performance in companies 
with outsider-dominated boards. Similarly, Fama and Jensen (1983) state that outsiders 
usually maximize shareholder wealth when performing monitoring functions. They 
argue that this is due to reputation concerns that drive outsiders to monitor better. 
Some studies argued that board independence is beneficial to shareholders during 
corporate takeovers. For example, Brickley et al. (1994) examine stock market reactions 
during corporate takeovers; they document a positive stock reaction after the adoption of 
a poison pill when outside directors are the majority. Brickley et al. (1994) conclude that 
independent directors serve the interests of shareholders during such takeovers. 
Similarly, Cotter et al. (1997) find that firms with a majority of outside directors benefit 
more from tender offers. They also find that shareholders gain more benefits in the 
presence of a poison pill when the board is dominated by outside directors. 
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On the other hand, some studies show that the presence of independent directors 
is not beneficial for the firm. For example, Bhagat and Bolton (2008) find that an 
increase of independent directors can lead to worse performance. Outside directors are 
also said to be worse at the advising role than inside directors. This is due to the fact that 
insiders are more knowledgeable when it comes to firm-specific information (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983; Raheja 2005). In addition, Maug (1997) contends that the benefits of 
increased board independence may not outweigh the costs where there is high 
information asymmetry.  
Several studies suggest that there are free rider problems associated with 
independent directors. Harris and Raviv (2008) suggest that it is sometimes more 
beneficial to have boards dominated by insiders because of these free rider problems. 
Similarly, Perry (2000) states that outside directors may have lower incentives to 
monitor effectively because they hold little stake in the company. Jensen (1993) states 
that it is the CEO who determines what information will be given to the board. Adams 
and Ferreira (2003) state that managers face a trade-off when disclosing information to 
the board. If they present the board with the needed information, they will receive better 
advice. But if they do, the board will be better informed of the managers' abilities. 
Brick et al. (2006) contend that outside directors and CEOs are involved in 
mutual back scratching where they exchange can exchange favours. They document a 
positive relationship between both the compensations of the CEOs and the directors. 
Also, they find that excessive compensation for both parties lead to low performance. 
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There are also problems associated with the CEOs and management of the 
company being able to influence the recruitment of outside directors (Crystal, 1991). 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) state that the CEO and board members have latitude in 
the selection process of board directors. This raises question on whether independent 
directors are truly independent. In the case where regulations force firms to maintain a 
certain number of independent directors, firms could hire directors that fit the legal 
description of independent directors, but may still be connected to the CEO in other 
ways (Romano, 2004). 
On the other hand, Fama and Jensen (1983) state that the influence insiders and 
CEOs have on the hiring of outside directors could have positive effects on the firm. 
Inside managers can use their superior information about the firm to nominate outsiders 
with specific skills and knowledge that can assist the company in areas where they are 
needed. 
Given the conflicting evidence concerning the presence of independent directors, 
some studies have suggested that there may be an optimal level of independent directors. 
Bhagat and Black (1999) find that firms with "supermajority-independent boards" are 
less profitable than other firms. They suggest that having a moderate number of 
independent directors may still be beneficial. Similarly, Linck et al. (2008) state that 
there is no optimal board composition for all firms. The board's composition is 
determined by the tradeoff between the costs and benefits of increased monitoring and 
advising. Linck et al. (2008) suggest that the composition of the board is directly related 
to firm complexity.  
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The determinants of board composition have been discussed in the literature. 
Boone et al. (2007) present three hypotheses which try to explain board composition and 
size. The first hypothesis, dubbed the scope of operations hypothesis, states that the 
firm’s size, age, and complexity affects the board of directors’ size and independence. 
As firms grow and become more complex, they need larger, more independent boards 
that are capable of performing their monitoring duties. Outside directors may bring in 
special expertise as the firms becomes more complex and branches out into new sectors.  
The second hypothesis, called the monitoring hypothesis, states that the board’s 
size and composition is determined by the conditions in which the firm operates. If the 
firm operates in environments where the cost of monitoring is high, they are more likely 
to have smaller boards with few independent directors. This may be the case in high 
growth firms and firms with high information asymmetry. 
The third hypothesis, the negotiation hypothesis, suggests that the board structure 
is a result of negotiations between the CEO and outsiders. If CEOs are hard to replace, 
they have considerable influence over outside directors. CEOs in that position are 
capable of placing insiders or affiliated outsiders on the board. 
2.2. Sarbanes-Oxley and Board Independence 
 
The aim of Sarbanes-Oxley act of 2002 (SOX) was to enhance the efficacy of the 
firms’ corporate governance and to diminish managerial engagement in fraudulent 
activities. One of the major implications of SOX is the increase in the participation of 
independent directors on corporate boards. SOX can be considered as an exogenous 
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shock that altered board structures. Guo and Masulis (2013) state that such shocks are 
useful for researchers because they provide an escape from endogeneity problem which 
occurs when studying firms’ boards of directors. They also describe how firms met the 
new regulations; they show that 5% of firms added more outside directors, 3% removed 
inside directors, and 92% did both. Guo and Masulis (2013) also look at the relationship 
between forced CEO turnover and board and nominating committee independence. They 
conclude that more independence leads to better CEO monitoring and discipline. 
Consistent with the traditional roles of outside and inside directors, Baldenius et 
al. (2011) show that the increase (decrease) in outsiders (insiders) as a result of SOX has 
increased monitoring and decreased advising functions in firms. Linck et al. (2008) state 
that boards increased in size, independence, and work post SOX. They suggest that 
regulations that impose the same requirements on board structure for all firms may be 
ill-conceived and might have moved boards away from their optimal compositions. In 
addition, Coles et al. (2008) state that “regulations prohibiting large boards and a high 
fraction of insiders on the board could destroy value”. Finally, Dah, Frye, and Hurst 
(2014) look at the effect of SOX on firms which were already compliant with the new 
regulations. They suggest that the legislation may have had unintended implications on 
already compliant firms.  
2.3. Diversification and Internal Capital Markets 
 
The issue of whether diversification destroys value has been under heavy debate 
in the corporate finance literature. The prevailing trend in the 50s and 60s was towards 
diversification (Berger and Ofek, 1995). This trend later reversed in the 90s as 
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researchers argued that diversification is negatively related to firm value (Graham, 
Lemmon, & Wolf, 2002). 
In an attempt to estimate the effect of diversification on firm value, Berger and 
Ofek (1995) examine the different segments in a diversified firm and compare the sum 
of the stand-alone values of those segments with the value of the firm as a whole. They 
find that the net effect of diversification does reduce firm value; the major costs of 
diversification coming from cross subsidization and overinvestment. Similar studies 
have been made by Lang and Stulz (1993) and Servaes (1996) who also find a discount 
due to diversification.  
Scharfstein and Stein (2000) try to explain how divisional managers are able to 
use rent seeking to exact large benefits from the CEO in the form of more capital 
allocation to their divisions. They state that managers in weaker divisions are more 
likely to resort to rent seeking because the opportunity cost for them to do so is lower. 
Their results imply a sort of socialism in diversified firms, where weaker divisions are 
subsidized by stronger ones. Similarly, Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000) show that 
funds flow to the most inefficient division when there is diversity of resources and 
opportunities among divisions in a diversified firm. 
There are also concerns on whether the diversification discount is endogenous. 
For example, Sautner and Villalonga (2010) look at the relationship between corporate 
diversification, corporate ownership, and the efficiency of firms’ internal capital 
markets. They used tax changes in Germany as an exogenous shock to measure the 
relationship. They find that firms with concentrated ownership have more efficient 
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internal capital markets and are less diversified. These results suggest that the 
misallocation of capital in internal capital markets is partly due to poor corporate 
governance, as suggested by Scharfstein and Stein (2000). 
On the other hand, several studies have argued that diversification may not 
necessarily destroy value. Hyland and Diltz (2002) state that diversified firms may have 
traded at a discount compared to their specialized counterparts before becoming 
diversified. They also find no additional value destruction after the firms diversify. 
Similarly, Campa and Kedia (2002) argue that the observed discount to diversified firms 
may not mean that diversification destroys value. The discount may be due to firm 
specific characteristics that cause firms to diversify. After controlling for such 
characteristics, they find that the evidence for the existence of a diversification discount 
becomes weaker. In general, these findings suggest that the correlation between 
diversification and firm value may not indicate a causal relationship, but rather the result 
of firms reacting to their environment. 
Billet and Mauer (2000) look at the relationship between firm value and the 
value of internal capital markets. They use an event study methodology where they look 
at the market reaction after the announcement of tracking stock equity restructurings. 
This allows them to observe directly the market’s assessment of the firm’s internal 
capital market. Billet and Mauer (2000) find positive stock reactions to tracking stock 
announcements. They also find that there is a strong positive relationship between such 
reactions and proxies for internal capital market value. 
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At the international level, Lins and Servaes (1999) show that a significant 
diversification discount exists in the U.K. and Japan, but not in Germany. This suggests 
that there are international differences between the interaction of corporate governance 
mechanisms and the effect of diversification on value. 
Some studies questioned the method used for measuring the diversification 
discount. Graham, Lemmon, and Wolf (2002) showed that business units that were 
acquired by diversifying firms were valued at a discount, and consequently contributed 
to the discount observed by studies in the 90s. Whited (2001) shows that the observed 
inefficiency in internal capital markets in many studies is due to measurement errors. 
Villalonga (2004) argues that the observed discount may be due to the way 
COMPUSTAT identifies segment data. Instead of using segment data from 
COMPUSTAT, she constructs business units based on the BITS database. This reveals a 
diversification premium instead of a discount compared to non-diversified firms. 
In relation to corporate governance, Anderson, Bates, Bizjak, and Lemmon 
(1998) find that more diversified firms have CEOs with higher pay levels and lower 
performance incentive based compensation. They also show that, compared to more 
focused firms, diversified firms tend to have more outsiders on the board, a higher rate 
of managerial turnover, and a similar turnover sensitivity to stock performance. Their 
findings provide no evidence that the failure of corporate governance mechanisms is 
associated with the decision to diversify. They also find no relation between corporate 
governance and value loss from diversification. On the other hand, Datta, D’Mello, and 
Iskandar-Datta (2009) show evidence that CEO equity-based compensation can improve 
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internal capital market efficiency. Their results suggest that CEO compensation can be 
used to ameliorate the diversification discount. 
Other papers have looked at how capital allocation decisions are made inside 
diversified companies.  Stein (1997) examined the role of the corporate headquarters in 
the allocation of capital in internal capital markets. He finds that managers’ self interest 
and empire-building behavior may not completely be a bad thing for the firm. Corporate 
headquarters can act as a special type of intermediary that can efficiently allocate funds 
inside the firm by engaging in winner picking. He also shows that there is a trade off 
when it comes to increasing the size of internal capital markets: more projects means 
more raised money, but this may lead to weaker monitoring. 
Finally, Shin and Stulz (1998) find that investment by a segment in a diversified 
firm is dependent on its own cash flows and the cash flows of other segments in the 
firm, but more so on its own cash flows. They also find that a segment’s sensitivity to its 
cash flows and the cash flows of other segments does not depend on its investment 
opportunities. Their results are consistent with Scharfstein and Stein’s (2000) 
proposition that segments are treated alike in diversified firms. 
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Chapter Three 
 
Methodology, Descriptive Statistics, and Results 
3.1. Sample and Methodology 
 
This paper examines the impact of board independence on internal capital market 
efficiency for the time period 1996 – 2008. Data for this research is collected from the 
Compustat, ExecuComp, and RiskMetrics databases. We split the sample into 2 sub-
periods: (i) Pre-SOX (1996 – 2001); and (ii) Post-SOX (2003-2008). SOX is represents 
an exogenous shock that led to an increase in the percentage of independent directors 
present on the board. In addition, we split our sample into two subsamples: (i) Firms that 
were not in compliance with the independence requirements prior to SOX and became 
complying afterwards; and (ii) Firms that were already in compliance with the new 
requirements before SOX. Furthermore, industry fixed effect is used to control for 
industry specific attributes. Industry is defined following Fama & French (1997) 
industry classification. 
We employ Berger and Ofek’s (1995) method for determining whether 
diversification enhances firm value. This method entails calculating the imputed values 
of a given firm’s segments and comparing the sum of those values to the value of the 
firm.  
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Equation (1) illustrates how we compute the imputed value which is the sum of 
the values of the segments treated as standalone firms I(V). AIi is the value of the 
accounting item (sales, assets, or EBIT) which is used in the valuation multiple. And 
     
 
  
 
  
 represents the multiple of total capital to an accounting item (sales, assets, 
or EBIT) for the median single-segment firm in segment i’s industry. 
(1)                    
 
  
 
  
 
 
   
 
After calculating the imputed value, we proceed to calculate the excess value of 
the firm EXVAL which is the natural log of the firm’s total value divided by its imputed 
value. If EXVAL is positive, diversification is said to enhance firm value (i.e. the sum of 
the values of the segments is greater than that of their stand-alone counterparts). 
(2)               
 
    
  
We also measure the internal capital market efficiency following Rajan, Servaes, 
and Zingales (2000). 
  
   
 and 
   
    
 represent the investment rate of a segment in a diversified firm and that of a 
single segment firm in the same industry. We look at the difference between these two 
rates in equation (3). 
(3)   
  
   
 
   
    
 
Due to the fact that the difference may represent exchanged resources among segments 
in a diversified firm, we adjust this equation as follows: 
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(4)  
  
   
 
   
    
     
  
   
 
   
    
 
 
 
Equation (4) would be positive if the segment in a diversified firm received a subsidy, 
and negative if funds are transferred to other segments. Wj is segment j’s share of the 
total assets of the firm. 
The sum of the absolute value of all transfers and subsidies in a given firm is the 
size of the internal resource allocations in that firm. Because we are using ROA, 
financial segments are not included. Equation 4 is weighed by the difference between 
ROAj and the average ROA of the other segments in the firm. Finally, the weighted 
subsidies and transfers are added for all segments in the firm and are standardized by 
total assets: 
(5)       
                     
  
   
 
   
    
     
  
   
 
   
    
  
 
 
  
 
 
We use a number of control variables related to firm characteristics and governance 
which are consistent with the existing literature on internal capital market efficiency and 
board independence (Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000) ; Scharfstein and Stein (2000) 
; Sautner and Villalonga (2010) ; Guo and Masulis (2013) ; Dah, Frye, and Hurst 
(2014)). Table 1 contains more detailed information about the variables used in this 
study. 
3.2. Descriptive Statistics 
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Table 2 Panel A compares the number of complying firms in the pre and post-
SOX periods. Firms are considered to be complying with the independence requirement 
if more than 50% of its board is composed of independent directors. Our sample 
includes 1161 firms in the pre-SOX period and 1155 firms in the post-SOX period.  
Non-complying firms were the minority in our sample in both the pre and post-
SOX period. In the pre-SOX period, non-complying firms comprised 18.35% of the 
firms in our sample. This percentage decreased to 4.5% in the post-SOX period. This 
decrease (increase) in non-compliance (compliance) is consistent with the findings in the 
literature (e.g. Guo and Masulis (2013)). However, there still exists a significant 
percentage of firms which are non-compliant in the post-SOX period and after the 
adoption of the new NYSE and NASDAQ listing requirements. This can be attributed to 
the difference between the way “independent” is defined in RiskMetrics and the 
exchanges. RiskMetrics does not classify a board member as independent if he/she was a 
former employee in the company. On the other hand, the exchanges can classify a 
former employee as independent if three or more years have passed since he/she left the 
company. In addition, the exchanges may consider certain business relations between a 
board member and the firm as insignificant if they do not go over a certain payment 
threshold. This may not be the case in RiskMetrics. The exchanges also exempt firms 
from the listing requirements if they are controlled companies where the owners hold at 
least 50% of the voting power. 
In Table 2 Panel B, we look at the differences in board composition between the 
pre and post-SOX periods. The results show that, on average, firms had 64.48% 
independent boards in the pre-SOX period. This percentage increased to 68.64% in the 
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post-SOX period. This is consistent with the findings of Guo and Masulis (2013) who 
find an increase in the percentage of independent directors in the post-SOX period. On 
the other hand, the average percentage of inside directors decreased from 21.53% to 
19.04% between the pre and post-SOX periods. Similarly, the percentage of linked 
directors decreased from 13.99% to 12.32% in after SOX. This is also consistent with 
the findings of Guo and Masulis (2013) who show that firms became more independent 
by removing/adding independent directors and/or removing inside directors. 
3.3. Board Independence, Diversification Discount, and ICM Efficiency 
 
3.3.1. Board Independence and Diversification Discount 
 
Independent directors are said to be better at the monitoring function, so it can be 
argued that better monitoring by the board due to the presence of more independent 
directors will be beneficial for diversification. On the other hand, the presence of 
independent directors may reduce the benefits from diversification due to higher cost of 
monitoring, asymmetric information, and free rider problems (Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
Furthermore, mutual back scratching and socialization may be present between outsiders 
and the firm’s top management (Brick et al., 2006).  
In this section, we investigate the relation between board independence and the 
firm’s excess value from diversification during the pre and post-sox periods. We first 
look at firms which were not previously compliant with the regulations in the pre-SOX 
era but became compliant post-SOX. Table 3 presents a regression of the three measures 
of excess value from diversification on the SOX dummy variable, the percentage of 
19 
 
independent directors, and various control variables. The regressions are also performed 
with and without an interaction variable between the SOX dummy and the percentage of 
independent directors. 
Column 4 shows that there is a negative relationship between the percentage of 
independent directors on the board and excess value from diversification in the pre-SOX 
period. Column 5 shows that, all else equal, firms that were previously non-compliant 
with the regulations have a lower excess value in the post-SOX era. Finally, column 6 
shows that the interaction variable between the SOX dummy and the percentage of 
independent directors has a negative significant coefficient. This indicates that board 
independence significantly reduces the excess value in the post-SOX period relative to 
the pre-SOX period.  
Linck et al. (2008) propose that firms choose their board structure based on their 
specific contracting needs. They state that regulations which alter board structure 
assume that boards are not at their optimum level, and attempt to fix that problem by 
enforcing a certain board structure. The results from Table 3 show that firms that were 
previously non-compliant with the regulations did not benefit from increased 
independence in the post-SOX period. The regulations which forced these firms to alter 
their board structures may have moved these firms away from their optimum board 
structure. 
Table 4 presents the regression of the three measures of excess value from 
diversification on the SOX dummy variable, the percentage of independent directors, 
and various control variables. The regressions are also performed with and without an 
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interaction variable between the SOX dummy and the percentage of independent 
directors. This table deals with the subsample of firms which were compliant with the 
regulations in both pre and post-SOX periods.  
Similar to the results in the Table 3, there is a negative relation between the SOX 
dummy variable and the firm’s excess value. Firms that were previously compliant with 
the regulations extracted less value from diversification in the post-SOX era. Unlike the 
first table, the relation between the percentage of independent directors and excess value 
pre-SOX is now positive. This indicates that board independence was beneficial to firms 
that were already compliant with the regulations before SOX. This is consistent with 
Linck et al.’s (2008) proposition that firms choose their board structure based on their 
specific contracting needs. In other words, compliant firms did benefit from such high 
levels of board independence due to their unique needs.  
Looking at the interaction variable in column 4 of Table 4, it seems that 
independence significantly reduces the excess value during the post-SOX period for 
previously compliant firms relative to the pre-SOX period. This is consistent with the 
findings of Dah, Frye, and Hurst (2014) who found that 55.8% of compliant firms 
increased their board independence post-SOX. They suggest that the pressure to increase 
board independence post-SOX was what drove the already compliant firms to increase 
board independence. It is also possible that management in firms which increased board 
independence might have intentionally hired directors who fit the legal description of 
independent directors but were linked to management in other ways (Romano, 2004). 
These directors may become free riders and not perform their monitoring role well. 
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Therefore, board structure changes in compliant firms in the post-SOX era could 
have also pushed these boards away from their optimum levels of independence. This is 
consistent with the proposition of Linck et al. (2008). 
3.3.2. Board Independence and Internal Capital Market Efficiency 
 
Shin and Stulz (1998) find that diversified firms treat segments with better 
investment opportunities in a similar fashion to other segments, which suggests that 
internal capital markets are inefficient.  Scharfstein and Stein (2000) propose that there 
is a sort of socialism in diversified firms, where weaker divisions are subsidized by 
stronger ones. They suggest that capital misallocation, as a result of inefficient internal 
capital markets, is partly due to poor corporate governance. Similarly, Sautner and 
Villalonga (2010) look at german companies and find that firms with concentrated 
ownership have more efficient internal capital markets and are less diversified. 
In this section, we examine the relation between board independence and the 
efficiency of internal capital markets. We first look at firms which were not previously 
compliant with the regulations in the pre-SOX era but became compliant post-SOX. 
Table 5 presents a regression of the two measures of internal capital market efficiency 
on the SOX dummy variable, the percentage of independent directors, and various 
control variables. The regressions are also performed with and without an interaction 
variable between the SOX dummy and the percentage of independent directors. 
In Column 2 of Table 5, we find that the coefficients for the SOX dummy and 
the percentage of independent directors are positive. Sadly, these first two coefficients 
are not significant. However, we do find a negative and significant coefficient for the 
22 
 
interaction variable between the SOX dummy and the percentage of independent 
directors. This indicates that, relative to the pre-SOX period, board independence has a 
negative effect on internal capital market efficiency in the post-SOX period for 
previously non-compliant firms. 
Table 6 presents the regression of the two measures of internal capital market 
efficiency on the SOX dummy variable, the percentage of independent directors, and 
various control variables. The regressions are also performed with and without an 
interaction variable between the SOX dummy and the percentage of independent 
directors. This table deals with the group of firms which were compliant with the 
regulations in both pre and post-SOX periods. 
Column 4 shows a significant positive relation between the percentage of 
independent directors and internal capital market efficiency during the pre-SOX period.  
However, the interaction variable between the percentage of independent directors and 
SOX has a negative and significant coefficient. This indicates that, relative to the pre-
SOX period, board independence has a negative effect on internal capital market 
efficiency in the post-SOX period. This is also consistent with Linck et al.’s (2008) 
proposition that regulations have pushed corporate boards away from their optimal level 
of independence. If outsiders are replacing insiders on corporate boards, these boards 
may become less capable of performing their advising duties. Independent directors may 
not have the necessary knowledge and experience with the company to be able to 
perform an advising role. The cost of adding more independent directors rises further if 
the directors being hired are involved in back scratching and socialization with top 
management, which reduces their ability to perform a monitoring role. 
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Chapter Four 
Conclusion 
This paper examines the effect of board independence on diversification and 
internal capital market efficiency. We make use of the exogenous shock caused by SOX 
and the changes in exchange listing requirements in 2002 in order to study the effect of 
increased board independence on the efficiency of internal capital markets in diversified 
firms. 
Our results suggest that imposed regulations which increased board 
independence may have had unintended consequences. The move towards higher 
independence may have moved firms away from their optimal board structure. We find 
that, relative to the pre-SOX period, increased board independence had a negative effect 
on internal capital market efficiency and diversified firms’ excess value in the post-SOX 
period. This suggests that firms did not benefit from the move towards higher 
independence in the post-SOX era. This applies to both firms that were previously 
compliant and those that weren’t compliant with the regulations. 
We attribute our findings to socialization and mutual back scratching between 
independent directors and top management. The increase in board independence may 
have given CEOs and top management an opportunity to hire independent directors who 
fit the legal description of independent directors but are linked to management in other 
ways. This explains why the documented increase in independence post-SOX had a 
negative effect on internal capital market efficiency. Our results are consistent with 
25 
 
Linck, Netter, and Yang (2008) who propose that a one-size-fits-all regulation may be 
inefficient and could move firms away from their optimum board composition. 
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Figures 
Figure 1 Compliant and Non-Compliant Firms Pre and Post-SOX 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Board Composition Pre and Post-Sox 
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Tables 
Table 1. Variable Definitions 
Variable Variable Definition 
Sox 
A dummy variable for SOX which takes the value of 0 in the pre-SOX period and 1 in the post-SOX 
period 
Percentage Independent The percentage of independent directors on a given board 
InSoxPercentage_independent The interaction variable between Sox and Percentage_Independent 
Firmsize The size of the firm, it is the natural log of Sales. 
Leverage Calculated by dividing long term Debt by total assets. 
Return on Assets Is Income Before Extraordinary Assets divided by Total Assets. 
E Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell’s (2009) E index for entrenchment. 
R&D Expense Research and Development expense divided by Total Assets 
Advertisement Expense Advertisement expense divided by Total Assets 
R&DDummy A dummy variable that takes the value of one if R&D Expenditure is missing and zero otherwise 
AdvDummy A dummy variable that takes the value of one if Advertisement Expense is missing and zero otherwise 
Capx_at The ratio of Capital Expenditures to Total Assets. 
Executive's Age The age of the CEO in years. 
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Board Size The size of the board. 
CEO Duality Dummy Variable for CEO Duality, takes the value of 1 if the CEO is also the Chairman of the Board 
BOa Berger and Ofek’s (1995) measure for excess value from diversification calculated using Total Assets 
BOs Berger and Ofek’s (1995) measure for excess value from diversification calculated using Sales 
BOe Berger and Ofek’s (1995) measure for excess value from diversification calculated using EBIT 
RSZ 
Rajan, Servaes and Zingales’ (2000) measure for internal capital market efficiency, calculated using 
ROA 
RSZq 
Rajan, Servaes and Zingales’ (2000) measure for internal capital market efficiency, calculated using 
Tobin’s Q 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics: Compliance and Board Composition 
Panel A 
Period Compliant Firms Non-Compliant Firms Total Number of Firms Percentage of Non-Compliant Firms 
Pre-SOX 948 213 1161 18.35 
Post-SOX 1103 52 1155 4.50 
 
 
Panel B 
Variable 
Pre-SOX Post-SOX 
Mean Mean 
Independent 64.48002 68.64277 
Inside 21.53014 19.03633 
Linked 13.98984 12.32091 
 
Table 2 Panel A shows the number of compliant and non-compliant firms in the pre and post-SOX periods. Compliant firms 
are those that have a percentage of independent directors that is higher than 50%. Panel B presents the means of the three 
different types of board directors in the pre and post-SOX periods. 
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Table 3. Diversification Discount and Independence for Previously Non-compliant Firms 
 
BOs BOs BOa BOa BOe BOe 
Sox 0.073 -0.304 -0.013 -0.469 -0.342** 0.394 
 
0.51 -0.77 -0.1 -1.33 -1.97 0.86 
Percentage_independent -0.005 -0.011 -0.004 -0.011* -0.007 0.005 
 
-1.17 -1.41 -0.98 -1.69 -1.35 0.49 
InSoxPercentage_independent 
 
0.009 
 
0.01 
 
-0.017* 
  
1.01 
 
1.42 
 
-1.69 
Firmsize 0.118** 0.119** 0.241*** 0.242*** 0.338*** 0.332*** 
 
2.09 2.11 5.14 5.22 4.8 4.71 
Leverage 0.076 0.079 -0.977*** -1.006*** -1.069** -1.126** 
 
0.18 0.18 -2.77 -2.88 -2 -2.08 
Return on Assets 0.01 0.01 0.006 0.006 -0.017* -0.016* 
 
1.36 1.33 1.01 1.01 -1.81 -1.71 
E -0.028 -0.028 -0.02 -0.018 -0.128 -0.129 
 
-0.47 -0.46 -0.4 -0.35 -1.46 -1.48 
R&D Expense 0.429 0.432 0.007 -0.003 -5.213*** -5.065*** 
 
0.28 0.28 0.01 0 -3.43 -3.3 
Advertisement Expense 0.814 0.836 -0.634 -0.339 -11.666** -12.518*** 
 
0.22 0.22 -0.17 -0.09 -2.58 -2.72 
R&DDummy -0.071 -0.085 -0.641*** -0.647*** -0.979*** -0.962*** 
 
-0.34 -0.4 -3.21 -3.26 -3.41 -3.38 
AdvDummy -0.347* -0.340* -0.056 -0.051 -0.028 -0.046 
 
-1.86 -1.82 -0.31 -0.27 -0.1 -0.18 
Capx_at -1.506 -1.658 -1.513 -1.618 -0.426 -0.287 
 
-1.36 -1.51 -1.35 -1.48 -0.4 -0.27 
Executive's Age 0 0.001 -0.006 -0.005 0.016* 0.015 
 
0.04 0.14 -0.8 -0.69 1.66 1.54 
Boardsize 0.008 0.004 0 -0.007 -0.082** -0.075** 
 
0.33 0.15 0 -0.29 -2.42 -2.23 
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 BOs BOs BOa BOa BOe BOe 
CEO Duality 0.316*** 0.304** 0.417*** 0.407*** 0.039 0.048 
 
2.61 2.52 3.74 3.68 0.24 0.3 
Constant -1.028 -0.795 -1.312** -0.991 -2.386** -2.762** 
 
-1.3 0.93 -2.24 -1.56 -2.12 -2.37 
Industry Dummmies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 638 638 547 547 377 377 
R-squared 0.43 0.43 0.4 0.41 0.4 0.4 
 
Table 3 presents a regression of the three measures of excess value from diversification on the SOX dummy variable, the 
percentage of independent directors, and various control variables for firms that were non-compliant to the regulations pre-
SOX. The regressions are also performed with and without an interaction variable between the SOX dummy and the 
percentage of independent directors. They also include industry fixed effects based on Fama and French (1997) 48-industry 
definition. The asterisks ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
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Table 4. Diversification Discount and Independence for Previously Compliant Firms 
 
BOs BOs BOa BOa BOe BOe 
Sox -0.249*** -0.257 -0.228*** 0.17 -0.423*** -0.08 
 
-5.23 -1.3 -5.29 0.89 -6.3 -0.24 
Percentage_independent 0.003** 0.003 0.004*** 0.007*** 0.0000395 0.003 
 
2.18 1.36 2.77 3.33 0.02 0.79 
InSoxPercentage_independent 
 
0.000125 
 
-0.006** 
 
-0.005 
  
0.05 
 
-2.11 
 
-1.05 
Firmsize -0.02 -0.02 0.084*** 0.083*** 0.068** 0.068** 
 
-1.12 -1.12 5.16 5.04 2.48 2.46 
Leverage 0.324* 0.324* -0.049 -0.05 0.461* 0.458 
 
1.85 1.85 -0.32 -0.32 1.65 1.64 
Return on Assets -0.003 -0.003 0.006** 0.006** 0.001 0.001 
 
-1.48 -1.48 2.52 -2.47 0.24 0.22 
E -0.037** -0.037** -0.034** -0.035** -0.075*** -0.076*** 
 
-2.14 -2.13 -2.02 2.11 -2.92 -3 
R&D Expense -0.820* -0.820* 0.638 0.657 -2.528* -2.513* 
 
-1.67 -1.68 1.29 1.33 -1.83 -1.83 
Advertisement Expense 1.132 1.132 1.049 1.023 -0.875 -0.853 
 
0.73 0.73 0.85 0.82 -0.45 -0.44 
R&DDummy -0.195*** -0.195*** -0.161*** -0.157** -0.102 -0.097 
 
-2.81 -2.81 -2.65 -2.57 -1.02 -0.97 
AdvDummy -0.003 -0.003 0.139** 0.143** -0.022 -0.018 
 
-0.04 -0.04 2.27 2.33 -0.2 -0.16 
Capx_at -0.948* -0.949* 0.614 0.648 -3.902*** -3.885*** 
 
-1.66 -1.66 1.42 1.49 -4.82 -4.81 
Executive's Age -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.010** -0.010** 
 
-0.35 -0.35 -0.53 -0.54 -1.97 -1.98 
Boardsize 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.003 0.007 0.01 0.012 
 
3.53 3.52 0.36 0.73 0.63 0.79 
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 BOs BOs BOa BOa BOe BOe 
CEO Duality 0.023 0.023 -0.029 -0.027 -0.013 -0.014 
 
0.53 0.53 -0.65 -0.61 -0.21 -0.22 
Constant 0.517 0.524 0.261 -0.023 1.718* 1.443 
 
0.95 0.93 0.6 -0.05 1.85 1.46 
Industry Dummmies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 3933 3933 3448 3448 2295 2295 
R-squared 0.25 0.25 0.21 0.21 0.27 0.27 
 
Table 4 presents a regression of the three measures of excess value from diversification on the SOX dummy variable, the 
percentage of independent directors, and various control variables for firms that were compliant to the regulations pre-SOX. 
The regressions are also performed with and without an interaction variable between the SOX dummy and the percentage of 
independent directors. They also include industry fixed effects based on Fama and French (1997) 48-industry definition. The 
asterisks ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.  
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Table 5. Internal Capital Market Efficiency and Independence for Previously Non-compliant Firms 
 
RSZ RSZ RSZq RSZq 
sox -0.002 0.002 0.013 0.012 
 
-1.27 1.03 1.02 0.74 
Percentage_independent -0.00002 0.00004 0.00006 0.00004 
 
-0.71 1.09 0.61 0.19 
InSoxPercentage_independent 
 
-0.00009* 
 
0.00002 
  
-1.79 
 
0.11 
Firmsize 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 
 
1.12 1.13 0.93 0.92 
Leverage -0.008 -0.008 0 0 
 
-1.05 -1.05 -0.02 -0.02 
Return on Assets 0 0 0 0 
 
-1.32 -1.32 -0.31 -0.31 
E 0 0 -0.005 -0.005 
 
1.19 1.18 -0.95 -0.95 
R&D Expense -0.006 -0.006 0.01 0.01 
 
-0.84 -0.83 0.68 0.67 
Advertisement Expense -0.002 -0.002 0.045 0.045 
 
-0.17 -0.17 0.83 0.83 
R&DDummy 0.003** 0.003** -0.001 -0.001 
 
2.38 2.43 -0.29 -0.3 
AdvDummy 0.001 0.001 0.007 0.007 
 
1.06 0.99 1.01 1.01 
Capx_at 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.005 
 
0.62 0.72 0.13 0.12 
Executive's Age 0 0 -0.001 -0.001 
 
-0.99 -1.03 -1.02 -1.02 
Boardsize 0 0 0 0 
 
0.58 0.76 -0.39 -0.37 
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 RSZ RSZ RSZq RSZq 
CEO Duality -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 
 
-0.79 -0.75 -0.68 -0.69 
Constant 0.002 -0.001 0.019 0.02 
 
0.29 -0.21 0.74 0.66 
Industry Dummmies YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1009 1009 1009 1009 
R-squared 0.09 0.09 0.05 0.05 
 
Table 5 presents a regression of the two measures of internal capital market efficiency on the SOX dummy variable, the 
percentage of independent directors, and various control variables for firms that were non-compliant to the regulations pre-
SOX. The regressions are also performed with and without an interaction variable between the SOX dummy and the 
percentage of independent directors. They also include industry fixed effects based on Fama and French (1997) 48-industry 
definition. The asterisks ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.  
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Table 6. Internal Capital Market Efficiency and Independence for Previously Compliant Firms 
 
RSZ RSZ RSZq RSZq 
sox -0.001* -0.006 -0.003 0.017* 
 
-1.7 -1.27 -0.81 1.84 
Percentage_independent -0.00004 -0.00008 -0.00003 0.0001** 
 
-0.95 -1.06 -0.35 2.03 
InSoxPercentage_independent 
 
0.00007 
 
-0.0002* 
  
1.15 
 
-1.96 
Firmsize 0 0 0.004 0.003 
 
-1.37 -1.38 1.23 1.19 
Leverage -0.001 0 -0.015 -0.015 
 
-0.17 -0.14 -1.36 -1.38 
Return on Assets 0 0 0 0 
 
0.63 0.63 -0.51 -0.49 
E 0 0 -0.003 -0.003 
 
-0.63 -0.58 -1.27 -1.31 
R&D Expense -0.014 -0.014 0.026 0.026 
 
-1.16 -1.17 0.87 0.87 
Advertisement Expense 0 -0.001 -0.081* -0.077 
 
0.06 -0.11 -1.69 -1.62 
R&DDummy 0 0 -0.013* -0.013* 
 
-0.45 -0.52 -1.69 -1.67 
AdvDummy 0 0 -0.011 -0.01 
 
0.91 0.76 -1.43 -1.4 
Capx_at 0.017 0.016 -0.092 -0.09 
 
1.57 1.54 -1.45 -1.42 
Executive's Age 0 0 0.001* 0.001* 
 
-1.07 -1.07 1.95 1.95 
Boardsize 0 0 0.001 0.001 
 
0.88 0.8 0.9 1.12 
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 RSZ RSZ RSZq RSZq 
CEO Duality 0 0 -0.002 -0.002 
 
0.37 0.38 -0.74 -0.75 
Constant 0.006 0.009 -0.032 -0.045** 
 
1.29 1.26 -1.59 -1.98 
Industry Dummmies YES YES YES YES 
Observations 5742 5742 5742 5742 
R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 
 
Table 6 presents a regression of the two measures of internal capital market efficiency on the SOX dummy variable, the 
percentage of independent directors, and various control variables for firms that were compliant to the regulations pre-SOX. 
The regressions are also performed with and without an interaction variable between the SOX dummy and the percentage of 
independent directors. They also include industry fixed effects based on Fama and French (1997) 48-industry definition. The 
asterisks ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
 
 
 
